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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic
heterogeneous agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and
savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting
tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model
which yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive education finance always leads to higher
income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is
assessed using a new measure which properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks
but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using
empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are
generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in reasonable values for the optimal rates.
Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only very crude lower and upper bounds around
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Absent the representative agent assumption, the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates is
determined jointly with that of the entire distribution of wealth. In this paper I present a frame-
work where these usually complex dynamics remain analytically tractable, and use it to study
fiscal and educational policy. I thus analyze the effects of progressive income taxes and redis-
tributive education finance on aggregate income, inequality, social mobility, individual risk, and
intertemporal welfare. For each policy I ask what degree of progressivity is efficient, or simply
growth—maximizing; I also compare the relative merits of two forms of redistribution. For such
questions to be posed realistically, two ingredients must be present. Redistributive policies must
have costs, due to distortions in agents' effort or savings decisions. They must also have benefits,
due to imperfections in asset markets; redistribution then provides both insurance and a means
to relax the credit constraints which impede certain investments.
To analyze this tradeoff theoretically and quantitatively, I develop a stochastic model of hu-
man capital accumulation with endogenous effort and missing credit and insurance markets. The
model also incorporates recursive preferences a la Kreps—Porteus where agents' risk aversion,
which determines the insurance value of redistributive policies, is independent of their intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. Explicit analytical solutions are obtained for all individual and
aggregate variables, under constant or time—varying policies.Given a reasonably broad menu
of fiscal instruments, intertemporal distortions are shown to be preventable: to each income tax
or education finance policy can be associated a simple combination of consumption taxes and
investment subsidies which restores savings to its (constrained) optimal level. The analysis also
demonstrates that progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes
and transfers. Both are equally effective at substituting for the missing credit market, but the
second policy entails smaller distortions to labor supply and (in the absence of corrective mea-
sures) to savings, because it redistributes only a fraction of family income. This comes, however,
at the cost of lower consumption insurance.
To evaluate more generally the extent to which market distortions and imperfections are wors-
ened or improved by alternative policies, the paper proposes a new measure of overall economic
efficiency. This criterion properly reflects (dynamic) variations in the aggregate consumption
of goods and leisure and in the idiosyncratic risks that agents face; but, unlike a standard so-
1cial welfare function, it does not reward interpersonal equality per Se. The underlying idea is
straightforward. Instead of aggregating individual incomes or consumptions (which washes out all
idiosyncratic uncertainty), or individual utilities (which introduces a bias towards egalitarian allo-
cations), one sums up consumption certainty—equivalents, so as to obtain a kind of risk—adjusted
GDP. Aggregate efficiency is shown to be maximized at some strictly positive rate of redistribu-
tion which depends intuitively on parameters like the elasticity of labor supply, the variability
of idiosyncratic shocks, and the growth losses from liquidity—constrained investments. Equity
concerns can be incorporated as well, but through a separate degree of inequality—aversion which
is a priori independent of individuals' attitudes towards risk and intertemporal fluctuations.
Complementing the theoretical analysis, the model is simulated with parameter estimates from
the empirical literature. In the baseline specification long run income (or growth) is maximized
by an average marginal tax—and—transfer rate of 21%, which corresponds to a share of redistribu-
tive transfers in GDP of 6%. Taking into account the value of insurance and leisure, efficiency
maximization raises these numbers to 48% and 14% respectively. Under the alternative policy of
progressive education finance, the income—maximizing equalization rate for school expenditures
is 62%, the efficient one 68%. In both cases, the efficient policy results in the top 30% of families
subsidizing the bottom 70%, whether through the fiscal or the education system. Maximizing
average welfare would always imply much higher rates of redistribution.
Naturally, these numbers should only be taken as providing a rough assessment of the main
policy tradeoffs. More important than the results corresponding to specific parameters are the
general lessons emerging from an extensive sensitivity analysis. First, the efficiency costs and
benefits of redistribution are typically of the same order of magnitude, so that neither side can be
neglected. Second, aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only very crude lower and
upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.
This paper relates to three strands of literature. First, and most directly, to the work on
growth and distribution with imperfect credit markets (e.g., Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993),
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Perotti (1993), Saint—Paul and Verdier (1994), Bénabou (1996a),
Durlauf (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997)).1 This literature has remained es-
tThis list is far from exhaustive: see also Banerjee and Newman (1991), Clomm and Ravikumar (1992), Fernan-
dez and Rogerson (1996), Bénabou (1996b), Gradstein and Justman (1997), Cooper (1998), and many others.
2sentially theoretical, with the notable exception of Fernandez and Rogerson (1998)who study
the quantitative impact of redistributing educational expenditures in a model calibrated toUS
data. The framework proposed here allows new developments on both the theoretical andthe
quantitative fronts. The second strand of literature deals with the implicationsof imperfect in-
surance markets for savings behavior and wealth inequality on the one hand, (Laitner (1992),
Aiyagari (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998)), for public insurance onthe
other (Varian (1981), Persson (1983), Hansen and tmrohoglu (1992), Atkeson and Lucas (1995),
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1998)).2 The present paperabstracts
from precautionary savings, which figure prominently in several of these models. On the other
hand, it lets credit constraints bear not just on consumption smoothing, but also on investment.
Finally, the paper relates methodologically to some of the asset pricing literature, both in its use
of non—expected utility (Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1990)) and in obtaining exact aggregation
in an economy with heterogeneous agents (Constantinides and Duffie (1996)). But whereas this
literature focuses on explaining asset price movements with real quantities being exogenous (en-
dowment economies), this paper explores the polar case of endogenous macroeconomic dynamics
in an economy with missing asset markets.
Section 1 describes the model, then derives agents' optimal labor supply and savings behavior
under progressive taxes and transfers. Section 2 does the same for progressive education finance.
Section 3 solves for the dynamics and steady—state values of total income and its cross-sectional
distribution. It also shows how to allow for endogenous growth in the model, without any of
the results being affected. Sections 4 and 5 develop an efficiency criterion for such dynamic,
stochastic economies with wealth heterogeneity, then relate it to aggregate income and social
welfare functions. Section 6 explores the quantitative predictions of the model through a wide
range of simulations. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are gatheredin the appendix.
2Here again, the list only a partial one. See for instance Aiyagari and Peled (1995) and Castañeda, Dfaz—Jimenez
and RIos—Rull (1998). A related line of work reassesses, under incomplete markets, some classical issues of optimal
taxation such as the long—run tax on capital (Aiyagari (1997), Chamley (1997)) or tax smoothing (Bassetto (1998)).
31 The Model
1.1 Preferences andTechnology
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents or dynasties, i[0, 1]. In period t, agent i chooses
consumption c and labor supply l to maximize his intertemporal utility Uj, subject to tech-




More generally, I use a specification of preferences which allows attitudes towardsintertempo-
ral substitution and towards risk to be distinguished (Kreps and Porteus (1979), Epstein and Zin
(1989), Weil (1990)). Because the latter determines the value placed by agents on the insurance
component of redistributive policies, it is important not to constrain it to any particular value.
On the other hand, the model's analytical tractability requires a unitary intertemporalelasticity
of substitution.3 Agent i's intertemporal utility at time t is thus defined recursively by:
lnU =max{(i -p)[lnc- (lJ + pln(Et[(U+iYDhIr)}. (2) It, c
The degree of relative risk aversion to lotteries over U1 is 1 —r0. When r =0the second
term in (2) becomes pEt[lnU+iJ, and utility reduce to (1). When rU preferences are not
time—separable, and agents care about both the magnitude of uncertainty and the timing of its
resolution.4'5 In period or generation t, agent i maximizes his intertemporalutility (2) subject to:
=(h)(1)' (3)
3This last assumption is ubiquitous in the literature on income distribution dynamics—generally in conjunction
with a myopic bequest motive rather than the dynastic one assumed here. See Glomm and Ravikurnar (1992),
Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Saint—Paul and Verdier (1993), Bénabou (1996a), (1996b),
Aghion and Bolton (1997) or Gradstein and Justman (1997). In this model, however, it will not result in a constant
(policy—invariant) savings rate, due to the progressivity of the tax schemes that will be considered.
4As explained in Weil (1990), agents prefer early resolution when their aversion to risk islarger than their
aversion to intertemporal fluctuations, i.e. when 1 —r>1.Conversely, they prefer late resolution when r > 0.
5With respect to labor supply, the model easily extends to the more general specification of felicityu =lnc—
v(l),V',v"> 0. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Gradstein and Justman (1997) use v(l) =— ln(1—1).The
specification (1)—(2) is more flexible, as the elasticity of labor supply is parametrized by 1/( —1).Specifically, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor is 1/(i —1),and in an intratemporal (or steady—state) context the
compensated elasticity of labor supply given a wage w and non—wage income R is 1/[i —1+ wl/(R + wl)J.
4= c(1 + 9) + e (4)
(5)
Human capital h is combined with labor l to produce output.6 The resulting pre-ta.x income y is
then subject to taxes and transfers, resulting in a disposable income denoted .Thegovernment
also taxes consumption c at the rate Ot and subsidizes investment in education e at the rateat.
These three dimensions of fiscal policy and the constraints linking them will be examined in more
detail later on. Equation (4) reflects the absence of a credit market to finance human capital
investment, requiring both consumption and education expenditures to come out of disposable
income.7 Equation (5) describes a child's human capital h+1 as the product of three inputs:
innate ability the quality of the home or neighborhood environment as measured by parental
human capital h, and purchased educational inputs such as teacher time, classrooms, books or
computers, (1+at) e. The uninsurable ability or productivity shocks are i.i.d. and log—normally
distributed: ln .Af(—s2/2,s2), hence E[J =1.8 Ishall also assume that lnh .iV(mo,)
and —without prejudging the distribution of in h, which is endogenous— denote its mean as rat
and its variance as L. Finally, let 17 ￿ 1 > p and a + fiA < 1.
The absence of any intertemporal trade is clearly an oversimplified (but quite common)rep-
resentation of asset market incompleteness; it represents the main price of analytical tractability
in the model. Intratemporai linkages between agents, on the other hand, could easily be incor-
porated —for instance a labor market with different skill levels being complements in production.
I shall nonetheless not pursue this extension, in order to better on focus the interactions —both
intra- and intertemporal— which arise through public policy.
6More generally, h could be any non—traded asset. Note that (3) should be interpreted as income net of the
remuneration of physical capital (which can be collateralized), as in Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Thus
if the production function is Y' =(h)'(k)'' (1)'", equating the marginal product of capital to a fixed world
interest rate rmakesy —rkproportional to (hflA (l)', with ) w/(1 —.i') andw"/(l —w').
7Thesimplest source of such incompleteness is the fact that children cannot be held responsible for the debts
incurred by their parents. The human capital accumulation on which the model focuses thus corresponds best to
early childhood, elementary and secondary schooling. It is much less relevant for college and beyond, where loans
(both public and private) are more readily available, at least in developed countries. Note finally that the education
expenditures e may be incurred directly, as with private school tuitions, or indirectly, in the form of property taxes
and land rents conditioning access to a community's public schools.
5The model can be extended to serially correlated shocks ,sayar(1). But it is much simpler, and qualitatively
similar, to replace the resulting ar(2)processby an ar(1) with higher persistence, by increasing c.
51.2 Progressive Taxation
The government redistributes income using marginally progressive taxes and transfers, as is the
case in most countries. I use the same log—linear scheme as in Bénabou (1996b) (1996c), so that
disposable income is:
=(y)lTt(yt)Tt, (6)
withUt defined by the balanced—budget constraint:
f ()l_T(Ut)Ttdi (7)
where litisper—capita income. The elasticity r of disposable to market income measures the
rate of (residual) progressivity in fiscal policy. Denoting T(y) —ythe net tax paid (after
transfers) at income level y, note that both average and marginal rates are rising when t>
Furthermore,Ttisequal to the income-weighted average marginal tax(andtransfer) rate:
f T'(y).(y/yt)di=r. (8)
Incentive—compatibility precludes Tt> 1,but nothing in principle prevents a regressive tax, t<0.
1.3 The Shadow Value of Human Capital




= #((1+ at)v)(h)_Tt)(l)(1_Tt). (10)
Clearly, optimal decisions will depend on the private marginal value of human capital, or equiv-
alently on the elasticity V 3 in U/0 in h. This shadow value will reflect future expected rates
9Note also that agents with average income are made better off>yt)ifand only if r, >0.A similar
"constant residual progression" scheme turns out to have been used in a couple of earlier (and static) models, to
study insurance or risk—taking (e.g., Feldstein (1969), Kanbur, (1979), Persson (1983)).
6of redistribution, both directly and through their impact on the intergenerational persistence of
human wealth, given by (10):
P(Tt) & + i(1 —Yt). (11)
The sequence of P(Tt) 's, which can also be thought of as inverse measures of social mobility, will
play a fundamental role throughout the model. In particular, one shows:





and Wt, which measures aggregate welfare in period t, is given in the appendix as a function of
{Tt+k, 9t+k, at+k}o.1°
Note how the marginal value reflects current and future rates of redistribution, but is invariant
to proportional consumption taxes and investment subsidies (a feature of logarithmic utility).
1.4 Labor Supply and Savings Decisions
The complete solution to the agent's problem is easily obtained from (12) and the first-order
conditions associated to (9)—(10). I first consider labor supply.
Proposition 2 Agents choose in every period a common level of effort, which decreases with
current and expected future tax rates {Tt+k}O
=[(/i)(i
—rt)(1+ p(l —pY'+i)] (13)
where is defined by (12). Under a constant tax profile t= r,in particular:
—((/8)(1—)(1
14 -1-p(a+(i-r)))
Recall that 1/(77 —1)is the intertemporal elasticity of susbstitution in labor supply, with
respect to variations in the real wage. The first result shows that the uncompensated elasticity
°Reca11 that, by definition, mt j in h di; therefore Wt =f0'In Ul di. Throughout that paper I shall use the
convention that Xk1 and 0 whenever s' <s,for any sequence of xk'S.
7with respect to 1 —t, thenet—of—tax (progressivity) rate, equals 1/i'. The second result makes
transparent the role of the other parameters, and will be useful when focusing on steady—states
later on. I now turn to agents' propensity to save out of disposable income.
Proposition 3 Agents choose in every period a common savings rate, ut= which decreases
with expected future tax rates {t+k}o
Vt— , (15) 1 —p+pi3V+1
where is defined as before. Under a constant tax profile, 'rt =T, inparticular:
u= (1-r)s. (16)
whereis the laissez-faire savings rate.
These results, and in particular the second one, show clearly how the progressive taxation
of income (a constant share ) of which is derived from human capital) distorts private savings
decisions. Income taxes, however, are not the only fiscal instrument available to policy—makers
and the voters who elect them. In particular, consumption taxes and investment subsidies provide
a means to correct intertemporal distortions.
1.5 Consumption Taxes andInvestmentSubsidies
Recall that the government taxes consumption at the rate G and subsidizes education at the rate
at, subject to the budget constraint:
p1 p1




Given a savings rate utanda relative price of education or similarly credit—constrained investment
goods 1/(1 + at), each agent's actual investment rate is (1 + at)ut. It can thus be restored to its
(credit—constrained)optimal level s p/3.X/(l
—pa)by a consumption tax of
8=5—Vt
(18)
whose proceeds are used to subsidize education. Moreover:
Proposition 4 For any sequence of current and future rates of redistribution {Tt+k}5, let
{Ot+k, at+k}iO be the unique corresponding sequence of consumption tax rates and investment
subsidies such that, in every period t + k
(i) the government budget is balanced, as described by (17);
(ii) agents' common investment rate is restored to its first—best level s, as described by (18).
Every agent i of every generation t prefers the policy sequence {rt+k,Ot+k,at+k}°O to any
alternative {t+k, O't+k, at÷k}O.
This unanimity result means that while the policy space is two—dimensional (taking into
account the budget constraint), the Pareto set is one-dimensional: distributional conflict concerns
only the degree of progressivity {Tt+k}O. Accordingly, I will from here on restrict attention to
undominated policy mixes, setting (1 + at) Vt =zfor all t.
Given a reasonably broad menu of fiscal instruments, redistributive taxation thus causes only
intratemporal distortions, namely those to labor supply." This result is consistent with the
empirical evidence from cross—country regressions, surveyed in Bénabou (1996c). There is no sign
of a negative effect of redistribution (shares of various transfers in GDP, average and marginal tax
rates) on national investment rates rates. In fact, the regression coefficient is more often positive
than not. By contrast, there is a positive association between labor tax rates and national
unemployment rates (Daveri and Tabellini (1997)).
If one wanted nonetheless to maintain intertemporal distortions in the model, one would simply
constrain at and Gt to zero. This might conceivably reflect the under-developed fiscal system of a
poor country, or some informational constraints which make subsidies to human capital investment
11The policy mix described in Proposition 4 is ultimately equivalent to using a progressive consumption tax to
finance a program of progressive education subsidies (with the same rate Yt)ofthe type studied in the next section.
Because it expropriates only labor and existing human wealth, such a policy generates only effort distortions.
Proposition 4 is thus related —but in an incomplete markets setting and with progressivity— to the classical public
finance results about the superiority of consumption taxes over (capital plus labor) income taxes. See Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980), Chamley (1985) and Judd (1985).
9impractical. Throughout the rest of the paper, all one would need to do is to replace s by Vt. As
shown by (16) this is particularly easy in steady-state, which will be our ultimate focus.
2 Education Finance
As an alternative to progressive income taxes and transfers, I consider the redistribution of edu-
cation expenditures (mainly from early childhood to the secondary level). This may correspond
to a policy of school funding equalization, such as those which have been mandated by consti-
tutional courts in many U.S. states, or more generally of subsidizing differentially the education
expenditures of rich and poor families or communities. Formally, let income itself remain untaxed,
=ut,while in (5) educational investment (1 + at) e is replaced by
=(1+at) (t/yflTt e. (5')
Thismeans that a family with income y faces the effective price p =(1 + at)'(y/t)Tt for
education. The progressivity rate t can also be thought as the degree of equalization of school
inputs, while at still represents the average rate of education subsidization. Indeed, with all
agents saving a fraction Vt of their income (as shown below), ê =(1+ at) 'it (y)l_Tt(t).The
polar cases of Tt =0and Tt =1correspond respectively to decentralized and egalitarian school
funding, with most states in practice falling somewhere in—between.12 Summing across agents,
the net subsidy is at 'it yt, to be funded as previously by a consumption tax.





withh' still given by (10). The solution has a similar structure to that obtained for fiscal redis-
tributions.
'2Some of the distributional and efficiency properties of these two polar regimes have been analyzed in Loury
(1981), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Bénabou (1996a) (1996b), Gradstein and Justman (1997) and Fernandez and
Rogerson (1998). Note that the redistributive scheme described in (5') is less detrimental to investment incentives
than if educational budgets were being redistributed directly (e.g., é =(1+ as is the case in
some US states such as California (see Hoxby (1998)).
10Proposition 5 The value function under progressive school finance is in U =V.(in h —rnt)+Wt,
where
= — p(r) (20)
and aggregate welfare W is given in the appendix as a function of {t+k, 9t+k, at+k}o.
The only difference with (12) is the absence of the factor 1 —rt+8 multiplyingeach discounted
product term. As a result, human capital is more valuable (V is higher), for all non—negative
sequences {Tt+k}O. This reflects the fact that progressive redistribution now applies only to the
fraction of income which is saved, and not to that which is consumed. As one would expect, this
lessens both inter— and intratemporal distortions.
Proposition 6 For any expected sequence of education finance equalization rates {rt+k},
agents'common savings rate Vt 5 still given by (15), but with V now defined by (20). In partic-
ular, under a constant education finance policy t =
LI—'°' = 21 —
1—pa+pT— 1+rs
As to agents's labor supply, it is now
it =[(i/8ii)(i+ p(l —p)1(1
—Yt)/314+i)]'1, (22)
so that under a constant 'r,
6 —
Notethat VtandI remain positive even for Tt+k1,which corresponds in equilibrium to
uniform funding of education, ê (1+at) Vt yt. In particular, steady—state effort remains bounded
below even as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution e1/ (i —1)becomes infinite.
As in the case of income taxes, the decline in savings can be fully offset by taxing consumption
at the rate O given by (18), and using the proceeds to finance the net (or average) education
subsidy at which restores the investment rate to s. Since the distortion to Vt15 nowsmaller, the
required rates of G and at are lower. Moreover, conditional on any {Tt+k}Othispolicy will once
again be supported unanimously, both within and across generations. As explained above, the
11remainder of the paper will incorporate this Pareto—improving policy mix, but if it were for some
reason infeasible one would simply replace s by Vtlflall derivations.
3 The Dynamics of Human Wealth and Income
Let us now take logarithms in (3) and (5) in the case of income taxes, or in (3) and (5') in that
of progressive education finance. Under either redistributive scheme agent i's net investment is
s(y)1—rt(y_t)Tt, sothe law of motion of human capital takes the form:
(24)
This implies that both h and income y =(h(lt)12remain log-normally distributed over time.
If lnl4 JV(mt, ),then
mt+i =(a--i3A)mt+ 3pJnl + /3Tt(2—rt)\2/2 + 31n + lnk —s2/2, (25)
=(a+I3\(1—r))2L+s2, (26)
wherethe first equation is obtained by substituting into (24) the break—even level of income
lny, =lnyt+ (1— TtP'.2/2 =Amt+ /1lnI + (2 —rt))2A/2, (27)
defined by the budget constraint (7). Finally, (25)—(26) easily yield the following results.
Proposition 7 The distribution of income at time t is ln y .A/(Amt + jinIt, )2), where mt
andevolve according to the linear difference equations (5)—(26) and It =l(Tt)is given by
Proposition 2 or 6. The growth rate of per capita income equals
lnyt+i —'flyt=1n—(1
—a—3A)inyt + i(lnlt±i —alnlt)
—C(r)A2/2, (28)
where ln )(lnk + 3lns) —)(1
—))s2/2is a constant and
£(r)a+X(1—r)2—(a+/A(1 —T))2 >0 (29)
measures the extent to which income inequality slows down growth.
12'While Propositions 2 to 6 dealt with the costs of redistribution, the above results bring to
light some of the benefits. From the point of view of equity, equations (24) and (26) show that a
higher 'rt works to reduce both the persistence p(rt) =c+ j3A(1— Tt) andthe magnitude
ofdisparities in human capital and income. From the point of view of efficiency, redistribution
provides a partial substitute for the missing credit market. This investment reallocation effect
is reflected in the last term of equation (28), which measures the shortfall in per capita income
growth compared to that of a representative agent economy. Because decreasing returns and
credit constraints imply that poorer families have a higher marginal return than wealthier ones,
redistributing education resources directly or indirectly (through income taxes) reduces this loss,
but only up to a point: £(r) is minimized for r =1—c/(1—i3A).The more important the comple-
mentary inputs provided by families and communities, i.e. the greater is c, the less redistribution
is called for —at least in the short run, whereis given.
Having solved for the economy's aggregate and distributional dynamics under any policy profile
{7t}Ishall now explore —first analytically, then quantitatively—how fiscal and educational
redistributions affect total income, inequality, risk—sharing and welfare. The exposition of these
policy tradeoffs will often focus on steady—states, but the results are derived more generally.
3.1 Steady—State Income, Inequality and Redistribution
• Asymptotic Values. Given a constant rate of fiscal progressivity or school finance equalization




and long—run income per capita is:
ln (3) y —
1—c—f3
Redistribution but has two opposing effects on long—run income. On one hand, it reduces labor
supply 1(r); it would also depress savings, were it not for the offsetting effect of consumption taxes
and investment subsidies. If those are for some reason infeasible, one simply replaces s by s(1 —r)
or z/(1 + rs) in the term ln. The other effect is to alleviate the misallocation of education
13resources due to credit constraints: by reducing C(r), up to some point, as well as 2(r), a
positive r tends to raise y(r). The degree of progressivity r which maximizes long—run output is
easily seen to: (a) decrease with the labor supply elasticity 1/i', the share of labor in production ,andthe discount factor p; (b) increase with the variability of shocks to ability or human wealth,
s2. The effects of a and I3A are generally ambiguous, and will be explored quantitatively.
• Endogenous Growth. The above results are easily transposed from long—run levels to long—
run growth rates, by allowing for knowledge spillovers in the accumulation of human capital.
This can be done in a "heterogeneity—neutral" manner (that is, without introducing additional
costs or benefits of redistribution), by replacing the constant #c in (5) with the human capital
11 iA •\ . . index'tf0 (he) di)
.Allprevious results remain unchanged, with kt simply substituted
for ic everywhere. In steady—state, the only difference is that the denominator in (31) is now
1 —a—— y.For a + 3A + 'y =1the numerator gives the economy's asymptotic growth rate,
which behaves with respect to r exactly as lny(r) did in the original specification.'3
• Redistribution in Steady—State. A tax rate r yields inequality .\(r) in earnings, but only
(1—r))Ar) in disposable incomes. When r is a rate of school finance progressivity, as in Section 2,
this narrowing operates only on education spending. To assess the extent of redistribution implied
by either policy, recall from (27) that the threshold separating losers and gainers is always given
by ln(/y) =(1
—T)A22(r)/2.i4This corresponds to a rank in the income distribution of
r(r) [(2 —r)A(r)/2)],wheredenotes the c.d.f. of a standard normal. Moreover:
Proposition 8 The Lorenz curve for a log—normal distribution with variance w2 is
F(r;w) = ('(r) —u), for alir E [0,1].
In the steady—state resulting from a rate of fiscal progressivity r, the 1 —r(r) richest households
constituting the net tax base thus earn
3The reason why the above definition of ictisheterogeneity—neutral is that it aggregates individual human capital
contributions with the same elasticity of substitution as total output. Alternative spillovers, embodying social costs
or benefits of heterogeneity in human capital interactions, can easily be dealt with by letting the elasticity of
substitution in ttbe,respectively, smaller or greater than 1/(1 —-y).See Bénabou (1996a).
t4By losers and gainers I mean: (i) families paying a net tax and those receiving a net transfer, when r describes
fiscal policy; (ii) families whose education expenditures are subsidized beyond the average rate a(r) and those whose
expenditures are taxed relative to a(r), when r describes school finance policy.
141 — F(r(r); Aer)) = 1 — ((2 — — A(r)) = (r)(r)/2) (32)
oftotalpre—taxincome. After redistribution their share falls to
1— F(r(r);(1— r))(r))=1 — 1 ((2 — r)X('r)/2 — (1 — r)XA(r))=(—rA(r)/2)). (33)
Theshare of net transfers in national income is therefore:
b(r)2c1(rXA(r)/2)
—1. (34)
When redistribution occurs only in school expenditures, the top 1 —r(r) families'shares
of disposable income, consumption and personal education spending are given by (32). The
proportion of school inputs actually allocated to their children, however is reduced to (33). Thus
(34) now describes the share of the total educational budget which is transferred from those above
to those below it. Multiplying this number by z translates it into a percentage of total income.
4 A Criterion of Aggregate Economic Efficiency
Aggregate income growth is important from a macroeconomic perspective, but provides only an
incomplete picture of the efficiency implications of redistributive policies. First, it omits the value
of leisure and other non—market activities; this could be remedied by looking at the aggregate
consumption—leisure bundle. More fundamentally, it fails to reflect redistribution's role as social
insurance: by the law of large numbers, individual shocks cancel out when computing aggregate
quantities.
Policies are most often evaluated according to some social welfare criterion such as Wo =
InU di or T0 j U di. Risk and effort concerns are now properly embodied, and I shall indeed
compute such utility aggregates. But the problem is that whereas aggregate income underestimates
the efficiency value of redistribution, aggregate welfare overestimates it. Because of the concavity
of individual utility, any such utilitarian criterion rises (keeping labor supply and savings fixed)
with all current and future redistributions, even when there are no shocks to be insured against
and no credit—constrained investments in need of reallocation.'5
'5For instance, in our model, even when s= 0and either (cs, 3A) =(0,0) (no accumulation) or c +/3.A=1
(accumulation with constant returns to investment).
15I shall therefore propose an alternative measure of pure aggregateeconomic efficiency, which
puts zero value on equity of consumption orincome per Se, and is affected by redistribution only to
the (full) extent that such policies: (i) distort effort and savings decisions;(ii) relax the liquidity
constraints which impede growth; (iii) reduce the idiosyncraticrisk faced by individuals. The
basic idea is very simple:
• First, replace agents' stochastic consumptions sequenceswith appropriate certainty—equivalents.
In this aggregation over states, the relevant parameter isthe degree of risk—aversion.
• Second, aggregate linearly individuals' certainty—equivalentconsumptions, which are thus
treated as perfect substitutes. More generally, when aggregating overindividuals the relevant.
parameter should be society's degree of inequality—aversion,which here is set to zero.
• Finally, aggregate over time using agents' commondiscount rate and intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.
The point of this construction is not that this is "the right" socialwelfare function, nor
that society should not care about equity. In fact, the next sectionwill explicitly incorporate
inequality—aversion into the analysis. The point is insteadthat one should be able to separate
efficiency concerns —namely, the extent to which market distortionsand imperfections are worsened
or improved by policy— from pure equity concerns.For instance, inequality of initial endowments
should not affect a measure of pure efficiency, unless wealth affects an agent's abilityto invest or
bear risk. Conversely, redistributions should affect an index oftotal efficiency only to the extent
that they change the "size of the pie" (the path of aggregate consumption) orthe riskiness of
individual "slices". We shall see that the index proposed above has these properties,whereas none
of the usual (utilitarian) social welfare functions, such as Wo or T0, do. (Thelatter also applies
to standard total compensating variation). These points will beestablished in the context of the
present model, but the underlying idea is clearly more general.
I shall now proceed to compute the efficiency criterion, focusing the exposition onredistribu-
tion through fiscal policy. The case of redistributive education financeis very similar; it is treated
in the appendix, and the main results are presented at the endof the next section.
By Proposition 1, the intertemporal utility of agent i in period zero canbe written as:
lnU =(1—p) (pt(i— Yt) HP(rk))(lnh —mo)+ pt(wt— pWt+i).
16The first term captures the lasting effects of differences in initial endowments. The second repre-
sents the part that is common to all agents, including labor supply and risk concerns. The same
level of intertemporal utility would clearly result from the deterministic, or certainty—equivalent
consumption sequence {e}definedby:
ln —ö(lt)(1 —Tt) A(1nh
—mo)+ (W —pW+1)/(1—p), (35)
with unchanged efforts {it}o. Moreover, it is shown in the appendix thatsimplifies to:
ln =E0[lncIh] +r (1 P) (is2)
(36)
In the absence of shocks, =c.When r =0,is the standard certainty—equivalent consumption
given time—separable, logarithmic preferences. In the more general case there is an extra term
which might be called (minus) the "resolution premium" for the shock .Itis negative when
tastes favor early resolution of uncertainty (r < 0), positive in the reverse case.
The next step is to compute total certainty—equivalent consumption, then E0 itself.
Definition 1 Let C J di. The aggregate efficiency of a tax sequence {Yt}0isdefined as:
E0 (1— ) pt[lnC —
Giventwo policies {Yt}0and{r}0, E—E0 can thus be expressed as a percentage difference





where WoJ'0' ln U di)7 Thus E0 differs from aggregate welfare by a term which increases
with janddeclines with all present and future rates of redistribution. As shown below, this
adjustment eliminates all effects of inequality except those relating to efficiency via market incom-
pleteness, so that E0 indeed satisfies properties (i) to (iii) postulated earlier. These results appear
t6That shock has variance 2andaffects the agent through h+1, which enters the intertemporal utility U1with
an elasticity equal to Vt÷t; see Proposition 1.
'7By (35), lnCt =j ln di+ (1 —Tt)2 flp(rk)2)¼21/2,and W0 = pt (f 1në di —
17most clearly with time—invariant policies, but are established more generally in the appendix.
Proposition 9 (a) The aggregate efficiency of a constant rate of progressive taxation -r equals:
E0 =(1_p)pt[lny-5(l))] +ln(1-z) -p(1-r)2 (1
_PP(T)2- (1_pp(y))2)(A2s2)
(b) For any initial conditions (mo,), E0 is maximized at some strictly positive y*E.
Theinterpretation is simple. The first term, which reduces to in y(r) —8(l(r))in steady—
state, captures the effects of redistribution on the path of total output, net of effort. These operate
through its influence on the allocation of investment and on labor supply (plus possibly on savings,
if s is replaced by v(r)), and were discussed earlier. Adding the second termyields the utility
derived by a fictitious representative agent from aggregate consumption and leisure. More novel
is the last term, which measures the disutility which agents suffer from uninsuredidiosyncratic
shocks —or conversely, the insurance and uncertainty—resolution value of redistribution. This risk
premium is always positive, hence minimized for T= 1;it is larger, the greater is agents' risk—
aversion 1 —r.Part (b) of the proposition is also quite intuitive: starting from -r =0,asmall
tax increase generates only second—order losses from labor (and possibly savings) distortions; but
due to market frictions it yields a first—order gain in insurance and in the allocation of investment
resources across differentially credit—constrained families.
Finally, note that E0 is independent of the distribution of initial endowments ,exceptto
the extent that it affects the present value of total output, through accumulation.Equation
(37) makes clear that such is not the case of Wo. It also shows that the median voter, whose
intertemporal utility is W0, would always choose taxes exceeding the efficient level.
5 Efficiency, Equality, and Social Welfare
I now extend the preceding results to social welfare indices which incorporate bothefficiency
and equity concerns. The procedure is the same as for constructing E0,except that individual
certainty—equivalents are aggregated with an interpersonal elasticity of substitution o0, whose
inverse 1/o measures society's degree of inequality—aversion (as in Atkinson (1970)):
18• —1 C(o)(I (ë)di) . (38) \\Jo I
Iwill also compute more standard social welfare functions, which areaggregates of (intertemporal)
utilities rather than risk—adjusted consumptions. These have the clearly desirableproperty that
maximizing such a criterion ensures Pareto efficiency. On the other hand, it will be seen that they
can not distinguish between the effects of policy which operate through its role as a substitute for
missing markets, and those which reflect an implicit equity concern.
Definition 2 For any o E R,definethe two social welfare indices:
So()(1-P)>pt{lflCt(cT)_8(l)],
To()in(f (U)di
The log—normality of the 's makes it again straightforward to compute each C(u),hence
So(a).18 As to To(a), it is easily obtained by recalling that lnU =V(lnh
—mo)+ W0. Hence:
Proposition 10 The social welfare levels resulting from a tax sequence {Tt}areequal to:
=w0 +(a—i) ((1 —p)pt(i —rt)2flP(rk)2)(2).
To(a) =Wo+ () ((i_P)Pt(i_rt)HP(rk)) (22)
The first result, together with (37), implies that So(o)canbe naturally decomposed into




or,in the simpler case of a time—invariant policy r:
'8By (35), 1nC() =f0'1nä di+ (-) (1 — Tt)2(fl:p(rk)2) .\2A/2.
19Sü(u)Eo -( pp(y)2) () (40)
By contrast, there is no value of o for which the utility—based criterion To(o) does not reward
equity per Se. Although To(o) can also be decomposed into aggregate efficiency and apure




—To()).The first cost of inequality (and benefit of redistribution) arises naturally from
society's aversion to disparities in welfare; given a constant r, it is proportional to (1—i-)2A2/2o-.
The second one, proportional to (1 —r)2.\2/2,arises mechanically and inevitably from the
concavity of individual preferences.'9
The final observation is that the utilitarian criterion W0 belongs to both families ofindices, and
therefore combines their two defining properties: exact decomposability andPareto—compatibility.
But it arbitrarily equates society's degree of inequality aversion 1/u, not even with individuals'
risk aversion 1 —r, which might perhaps make sense in an ex—ante "veil—of-ignorance"perspective,
but with the inverse of their (unitary) intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In studying efficiency and its relation to aggregate output and social welfare, I haveso far
concentrated on policies of income redistribution. The case of progressive education finance is
treated similarly in Section C of the appendix, where I show:
Proposition 11 The economic efficiency and social welfare indices E0, So(u) and To(u) resulting
from a sequence of education finance progressivity rates {r}i0 are given by the same expressions
as in equations (37)—(40) and Propositions 9—10, except that the terms (1 —Tt)2 and(1 —r)2are
replaced by 1.
The absence of the terms in (1 —Tt)2reflects,once again, the fact that parental consumption is
not expropriated. This was shown to reduce both intra— and intertemporal distortions, compared
to the case of income taxes. The counterpart, as made clear by Proposition 11, is that redistribu-
19Recall that U = with V0 E [0,1]. The fact that So(oo)—To(oo) is indeed a positive welfare
cost (whether or not r is constant) follows from:
So(2(oc)= ((1 _P)Pt(1_rt)2HP(rk)2) - ((1 t(, _rt)fJP(rk)) ￿0,
since (1) p2t/2x)2 ￿(1—a)t) P') = ptx) forall Xt0, by Schwartz's inequality.
20tional education finance offers less risk—sharing. For instance, with income taxation r =1yields
full consumption insurance (hence E0 (1 _p) Oopt[lnyt —5(lt)'1)] +ln(1 —z)); but when only
educational inputs are equalized, individuals families remain exposed to significant risk
6 Quantitative Analysis
That redistribution may generate output and efficiency gains when insurance and credit markets
are incomplete has been understood for quite some time. Yet there has been little attempt to
evaluate the size of these gains and compare them to the losses from distortionary taxation. Two
notable exceptions are Inman (1978) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1998). Inman examines how
different education finance schemes affect a social welfare function in a static model. Calibrating
an overlapping generations model with educational bequests to U.S. data, Fernandez and Rogerson
(1998) find that moving from local to state finance would increase steady—state output by about
3%. In both models the distortions induced by redistributive policies affect utilities but not
incomes, as there is no labor supply or personal savings decision. Also absent are family or social
inputs into education, which were seen earlier to potentially reduce the efficiency of redistributive
schemes (and also clearly matter for mobility). Neither is there any role for insurance, which has
the reverse effect.
The present framework incorporates these elements into a more comprehensive analysis of
the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution, be it fiscal or educational. Given the model's
simplicity and the fact that the empirical literature provides only imprecise estimates of certain
key parameters, however, the results should still be read as a only broad assessment of the main
tradeoffs. Two points in particular should be kept in mind. On one hand, credit and insurance
markets are completely absent from the model, rather than simply imperfect; there is also no
precautionary savings. These factors all tend to overstate the benefits of redistribution, so I
will compensate by using conservative values for agents' risk—aversion and the effectiveness of
educational expenditures. On the other hand, by focusing on the efficiency criterion E0 one
abstracts from many potential sources of losses from inequality. These include of coursepure
equity concerns such as those embodied in standard social welfare functions, but also production
complementarities (as in Tamura (1992) or Bénabou (1996a)), political instability, crime and other
21forms of rent—seeking. These omissions all tend to understate the benefits of redistribution.20
6.1 Parameter Values
• Production. The shares A and ,a of human capital and labor are determined by "maximizing out"
physical capital, which is not subject to borrowing constraints, from a three—factor production
function.2' This follows Barro, Mankiw and Sala—i—Martin (1995) and, like them, Iuse the shares
estimated by Jorgensen, Goilop and Fraumeni (1987): .5 for human capital, .3 for physical capital,
and .2 for labor. This yields A =.5/.8=.625and i= .3/.8=.375.
• Accumulation. Most estimates of intergenerational persistence p(r)a + 3A(1 —i-) range
from about .3 to .55 (Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992), Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson (1996)).
Mulligan (1995) finds values of .5 to .7 for family income, and up to .8 for consumption. I set
a =.35and =.4,which allows p(r) to range from .35 to .60. The chosen value of /3 implies an
elasticity of children's income to education expenditures of 3A =.25.This is slightly above the
value of .19 used by Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), but well below those of .35 and .45 used by
Hendricks (1998) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), respectively.22 Fernandez and Rogerson
base their choice on the studies of Card and Krueger (1992), Johnson and Stafford (1973) and
Wachtel (1976), which all imply elasticities of about .2. Hendricks appeals to the estimates of
Haley (1976) and Heckman (1976). In a recent study using historical data on US States, Tamura
(1998) finds the elasticity of income to school expenditures to be at least .4. Given its critical role
in the accumulation of human capital, /3A will be allowed to vary from 0 to .4 in the sensitivity
analysis.
• Inequality. Given a and /3A, the variability of idiosyncratic shocks determines the feasible
range for steady—state inequality: A(-r)[As/V1 —a2,As/1 —(a+ /3A)2]. If one approxi-
mates the US distribution of family incomes as a log—normal, the mean—to—median ratio implies
20So will the fact that the simulations focus (for simplicity) on steady—states. Proposition 9 showed that, forany
initial conditions (mo, Ag), TE,Oargmax,- [Eo(i-; ma, > 0;this takes into account the full transition path
from (mo,) to (m(r),2(,-)). On the other hand, argmax,. [Eo(r;m(r),A2(i-))] need not be positive a priori.
2tSee footnote 6. Note that since the optimal amount of physical capital used by agent i is proportional to the
reduced—form net output y =(h)A(1' ,sois gross output from the three factors: y/Y =1—w'=y/Y. 22Asis well—known, the effect of (marginal) variations in school expenditures on educational and labor market
outcomes is the subject of significant empirical controversy. The traditional view that there is little demonstrable
effect at the elementary and secondary levels is represented by Hanushek (1986). In a recent and broader meta—
analysis, Dewey, Husted and Kenny (1998) provide evidence that the lack of significant positive estimates is largely
the result of systematic econometric misspecification in many earlier studies.
22a standard deviation of log—incomes of about .61 in the 1990 Census and .69 in that of 1995.
Computing the variance directly from data on the decile income distribution leads to higher val-
ues, between .75 (1990 Census) and 1.1 (fiscal data of Bishop, Formby and Smith (1991)). I set
s =1.0,so that the feasible range for steady—state inequality is [.67, .78].
• Labor Supply. A small number of microeconomic studies, surveyed in Browning, Hansen
and Heckman (1998), provide direct estimates of the intertertemporal elasticity of substitution,
—1).Values for males vary between 0 and .40, with a median of about .20; the sole
study on female participation yields a value of 1.6. All such estimates, however, are predicated
on the assumption of a frictionless credit market —which is precisely the one we depart from.
Intratemporal elasticities are not subject to this problem, and also more consistent with the present
focus on lifetime outcomes and steady—states. Cross-sectional estimates of the compensated labor
supply elasticity for men are surveyed by Ashenfelter (1984) and Pencavel (1986); they typically
vary around .10. For women, Killingsworth and Heckman's (1986) survey includes both high
and insignificant values, with a median of about .43. In view of both inter- and intra-temporal
estimates I choose a reference value of e =.20,but in the sensitivity analysis I will explore the
full range from 0to oo.23As to the coefficient on labor disutility 8l', it can be normalized
to 5 =1without loss of generality.
• Discounting. The standard discount factor used in macroeconomic models is approximately
.96 per year, which compounds to .9625 =.36per generation (25 years). However, this computa-
tion is quite sensitive to the choice of the annual value: •9725 =.47,while .9825 =.60.I set p =.4
in the reference case, then let it vary between .2 and .8.
• Risk—Aversion. For the coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 —r,I focus on two values of
interest. The first is 1, which corresponds to the intertemporally separable log—utility. The second
is 2, which is a more standard estimate of risk-aversion, yet still on the conservative side. In the
sensitivity analysis 1 —rwill vary from zero (static risk—neutrality) to 4.
I report through a series of graphs the simulations for steady—state output ln y('r), utility from
23Given the utility function (2), the uncompensated elasticity for a wage w andnon—wage income R is (' =
R/(('q—1)R+w1), and the marginal propensity to earn out of non—wage income is rnpe =—wl/((ij—1)R+i7wl).
Conversely, we can write =1/(77
—1)=(7[1 + mpe} ,where(C= (1 +rripe is the compensated elasticity. Thus
typical values such as ('—mpe E [.10, .20] yield in the range [.11, .25]. For instance, (C=.11 in Lucas' (1990)
parametrization, and (C=.19 in that of Hendricks (1998).
23aggregate consumption and leisure lnz(r) lnC(r) —6(1(r))', efficiency E(T),andwelfare W(r);
all are measured as deviations from their values under laissez—faire (r =0).The four functions
are always single—peaked, with maxima at r <r<T < r.I also graph net transfers
b(r), intergenerational mobility p(r), income inequality .X(r), labor supply 1(r), private savings
v(r), and the combination of consumption taxes and investment subsidies (0(r), a(r)) required
to restore the rate of accumulation to its undistorted level s. Finally, Tables I and II show how
the optimal redistribution rates (r,, T,r,r) vary with e and A. This extensive sensitivity
analysis also allows readers to replace our benchmark values for these two key parameters with
their preferred ones.
6.2FiscalRedistribution: Benchmark Case
• Income. Figures la and 2a show that maximum per capita income occurs at r =20.9%,which
corresponds to a share of net transfers in GDP of b(r) =6.2%.The output gain with respect
to laissez—faire is 1.3%, representing the balance of a 2.7% shortfall due to the fact that agents
reduce hours by 4.4% (Figure 2c), and a 5.0% increase from relaxing the liquidity constraints of
poorer families. In a representative agent setting (s2 =0)only the first, negative, effect would be
present. Figures 2d and 2e show that the savings distortion is fully offset by a consumption tax
of 2.7%, used to finance a 26.4% subsidy for human capital investment.24 Finally, note that in
the endogenous growth version of the model the 1.3% net gain in long run income becomes a 0.5
percentage point rise ih the long run growth rate.
• Efficiency. With 1—r =1total efficiency is maximized at r =48.5%,which corresponds to
a transfer share b(r) =13.7%(Figures la and 2a). The gain relative to r =0is the same as would
result from an increase in every agent's consumption of 9.6%. The actual effect of ronaggregate
resources, however, is a decline of 0.9% (—7.4% from decreased labor supply versus +6.5% from
the relaxation of credit constraints). But this is more than offset by the 12.1% reduction in effort,
worth a 3.6% increase in consumption, and especially by the value of insurance, equivalent to
another 6.8% of aggregate consumption. Neutralizing the savings distortion now requires a 6.4%
consumption tax and a 94.3% subsidy for human capital investment.
24The economy's investment rate then remains at s =11.6%of aggregate income net of physical capital's re-
muneration, which corresponds to s(i —w') = 8.1% of total factor income. Absent the corrective policy mix, the
decline in savings would reduce aggregate output by (.)¼P)(1 —a—/3A)'In (U(Ty)/5)= 14.6%.
24Figures la—lb also illustrate one of the most important results, namely the relationship be-
tween aggregate income, economic efficiency, and a utilitarian social welfare function. In addition
to the utility from leisure, the vertical distance between the lny(r) and E(r)curvesmeasures
the insurance value of taxation, which increases with risk aversion 1 —r.The additional distance
between E(r) and W(r) reflects the pure equity value of redistribution, for a degree of inequality
aversion 1/a =1.More generally, each value of 1/cr > 0 defines a social welfare function S(cr)
above E =S(oo).
• Inequality and Mobility. Figure 2b plots intergenerational persistence and cross—sectional
income inequality. Going from laissez—faire to=20.8%reduces p(r) from .60 to .55, and a
further increase to=48.5%brings it down to .48. Equivalently, the annual convergence rate
rises from 2.0% to 2. 4% and then 2.9%. The effect on long—run inequality is similar: as r rises
from zero to r, and then to r, AA(r) first falls from .78 to .75, then to .71.
• Redistribution. To assess the extent of redistribution implied by different values of r, recall
that it is also the (income—weighted) average marginal tax—and—transfer rate. For taxes alone,
the weighted marginal rate in the US varies between 23% in the late 1970's and 17% in the late
l980s.25 There is no readily available data on the incidence of transfers, but these are typically
distributed much more progressively than taxes. A more relevant range for the true value of r
could thus be between .3 and .4, implying r <r <r.26 Another way to measure redistribution
is to look at net transfers. In the United States the share of transfers in GDP is about 16% to
18%, but only about half are genuinely redistributive; the other half consists of social security
and medicare payments. In the model, with r =20.8%the cutoff between losers and gainers
occurs at the 75th percentile, where family income is 1.25 times the average, or 1.65 times the
median. The top 25% households earn 53.1% of total pre—tax income, but after redistribution
their share falls to 46.1%.27 Net transfers thus represent b(r) =6.2%of national income; see
25These are typical estimates reported by Easterly and Rebello (1993) and Gouveia and Strauss (1994). Using
the income tax data by decile reported by Bishop, Formby and Smith (1991), I computed that same number and
again found values of 21% to 24% for 1979 and 17% to 19% for 1988.
26For instance, Lambert (1993, chapter 10) computes an index of progressivity of the U.S. net fiscal system which
is a properly weighted average of indices for taxes and benefits. He finds that the inclusion of the latter more than
doubles overall progressivity. In the case of Chile, Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1998) find that the targeting of
transfers and other public expenditures is by far the main source of income equalization in the fiscal system.
27As a comparison, the richest 30% households in the United States earned 60% of total income in 1986 (Bishop,
Formby and Smith (1991)).
25Figure 2a. Under the efficient policy r =48.5%the cutoff occurs at the 70th percentile (1.11
times the average, or 1.43 times the median). The pre— and post—redistribution shares of the
top 30% families are 56.9% and 43.1%, hence a share of net transfers b(T)= 13.7%.Finally,
if policy is set by the median voter —or, equivalently, a social planner with inequality aversion
1/a =1—his purely distributional concerns will lead to=61.2%,and transfers will rise to
b(r)= 17.0%of national income. In summary, looking at either the average marginal tax rate
or the transfer share suggests (quite tentatively, or course) that fiscal redistribution in the United
States exceeds the income or growth—maximizing level, could be somewhat below the efficient
level, and is markedly lower than the median family's preferred outcome.28
6.3FiscalRedistribution: Sensitivity Analysis
Figures 3a—3b show how the tradeoff between the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution
worsens as the elasticity of labor supply1/(i—1)rises. Table I provides more detail on the
optimal values 4-,r,r and rfl,, which all decline with €.Lookingfor instance at the row which
contains the benchmark case, we see that in the absence of distortions 4-wouldbe 66.8%, whereas
beyond e =0.5redistribution only reduces total income. By contrast, the efficient tax rate and
transfer share always remain positive. When e =1,for instance, r =28.7%and b(r) =8.4%,
yielding a gain of 4.8% in aggregate certainty—equivalent consumption. Even astendsto infinity
these numbers remain bounded below by 14.5% and 4.4% respectively (with a gain of 1.6%).
The effect of the education return parameter 3A is more complex. Figures 4a—4b and Table I
show a significant positive impact on 4-,butonly a small negative one on3\ mainly affects
the size of the gains in E(r). The intuition is as follows. When 3\ =0there is no investment,
so redistribution can only reduce output and deteriorate the consumption—leisure tradeoff; hence
== 0.Nonetheless, the insurance motive implies r > 0. Table I shows that r is
25There are several possible (complementary) explanations for this last result. First, it is well—documented that
the propensity to engage in most forms of political participation (voting, contributing time or money to campaigns
or parties, etc.), rises markedly with income and education; some of this evidence is presented in Benabou (1996b).
Second, the observed levels of progressivity and transfers may be consistent with a median voter outcome r,
if voters perceive sufficiently large tax distortions. As shown by Table I below, these would have to correspond
to an intertemporal labor supply elasticity well above 2, and/or to an inability to offset savings distortions via
consumption taxes and investment subsidies, as done in the model. Last, but not least, I am considering (here and
in the next subsection) fiscal and educational redistribution separately. In reality both are present simultaneously,
and their effects cumulative.
26even fairly high since the labor disincentive is relatively small when human capital is not very
persistent (see (14)). As 3X rises the investment reallocation effect becomes increasingly important
and gradually replaces insurance as the predominant benefit in the efficiency tradeoff with the
(now stronger) labor supply effect. Consequently, r and i move towards each another.29'30
The role of the family or neighborhood effect is illustrated on Figures 5a—5b, We know from
Propositions 6 and 7 that a higher ct simultaneously exacerbates the effort distortion and reduces
the gain from reallocating education resources toward poor families. On the other hand, it also
makes human capital accumulation less sensitive to variations in investment, hence in effort, since
more of it takes place "automatically" within families or neighborhoods (see the term 1 —c
multiplying ilnl(r) in (31)). This effect turns out to be dominant at relatively low values of r,
but dominated at higher ones. This is what explains the initially puzzling results thatr- increases
with c while r simultaneously decreases, in spite of the fact that more persistent shocks raise
the value of insurance (as shown by the risk premium in (9), for r =0).
Last but not least, Figure 6a shows the role of risk—aversion. The efficient rate of redistribution
r starts at 36.3% for 1 —r=0,then rises to 48.5%, 55.6% and 63.9% for 1 —r1,2 and 4
respectively. The corresponding shares of net transfers in national income are b(-r.)= 10.5%,
13.7%, 15.5%, and 17.6%. These large variations make clear the value of working with the general
preferences (2) rather than restricting attention to the separable case, r =0.Finally, note that in
all cases r remains well below r and well above r (or even ri), as shown on Figure lb.
Beyond the results obtained for specific parameters values, it is the general message from these
simulations which is most important. They consistently show that the efficiency costs and benefits
of redistribution are both quantitatively important, and that per capita income andaggregate
welfare provide only very imperfect measures of the resulting tradeoff.
29The only column of Table I along which r decreases with 3A is the first one, where e =0.Indeed, when there
is no distortion to trade off against the credit—constraint effect £(r)2(r),the latter's increasing magnitude with
!3A is irrelevant. All that matters is the fact that argmin,- {Z(r)2(r)}declineswith A, due the predominant
influence of arginin,. {(r)} =1—/(1
—
30Theresults remain essentially unchanged when a and 3\ are varied with a + /3A fixed at its reference value of
.60, 50 as to leave total returns unchanged.
276.4 Education Finance: Benchmark Case
• Income. Because current consumption is not redistributed, policy distortions from equalizing
educational investments are considerably smaller than from equalizing family incomes. Figure
7a shows that the output—maximizing rate is now=61.9%,leading to a sizeable 6.1% gain
with respect to laissez—faire. The fall in labor supply is only 1.3%, as can be read off Figure 7c.
On the savings side, a consumption tax of 0.9% and a 7.2.% average subsidy for education are
now sufficient to maintain accumulation at its first—best level, still equal to s =11.6%.31In the
endogenous growth version of the model, the 6.1% increase in per capita income becomes a 2.4
percentage point rise in the long—run growth rate.
• Efficiency. With 1 —r =1,the efficient rate of education finance equalization is r =68.2%.
In other words, about two—thirds of the variations in per—pupil expenditures reflecting differences
in family incomes should be offset. The corresponding efficiency gain is 7.3%, of which 6.0% is
due to increased aggregate income and consumption, 0.6% to lower effort, and only 0.7% to better
risk—sharing. Figures 7a—7b clearly show the reduced value of redistributive education finance as
a social insurance scheme, compared to that of taxes and transfers: E(r) is closer to in z(r) than
on Figures la—ib, and much less sensitive to agents' degree of risk aversion.
• Inequality and Mobility. Since the optimal rate of progressivity is higher than for fiscal policy,
intergenerational persistence and cross-sectional inequality are reduced further. Figure 8b shows
that as Trisesfrom zero to r and then to r, p(r) falls from .68 to .45 and then to .43. Cooper
(1998) finds evidence in the PSID data that redistribution of educational expenditures (measured
by the percentage of school funding coming from outside each district) lowers intergenerational
persistence between fathers' and sons' incomes. Consider next inequality in family incomes and
per—student expenditures ,X(r)and (1 —)(r).These are reduced from (.78, .78) under
laissez—faire to (.70, .27) under ri,, (.69, .22) under r, and (.68, .08) under T%87.4%.The
expenditure numbers may be compared to Hoxby's (1998b) estimates of the coefficient of varia-
tion in per—pupil spending among local school districts in California, Illinois and Massachusetts:
respectively .16, .25 and .28 for recent years. When normalized by state—wide income inequality,
3tAbsent this corrective scheme, the decline in savings would reduce from 6.6% to 2.3% the gain in long—run
income resulting from r =61.9%.
28the corresponding ratios are all around .15. The values generated by the model thus tends to
suggest that the extent of school finance redistribution in those three states exceeds the level
that would maximize long—run income (or growth), but is below what the median agent would
choose, or what would maximize average welfare. It may be somewhat lower or higher than the
efficiency—maximizing level, depending on the value of risk aversion.32
• Redistribution.Under the policy the break—even pointwhich separates families
whose education is subsidized beyond the average rate a(r) from those whose expenditures are
taxed relative to a(r) occurs at the 69th percentile (1.10 times per capita income, or 1.40 times
the median).The 31% richest families earn 58.5% of total income, but their share of total
educational expenditures is reduced to 41.4 %.Thefraction of total school spending reallocated
from to relatively rich to relatively poor families or communities is thus b(r,) =17.1%.As
illustrated on Figure 8a, it rises to 18.7% under the efficient policy r (the cutoff remains almost
unchanged, at the 68th percentile), and to 23.2% under the policy r, which maximizes average
welfare and the utility of the median family.
6.5 Education Finance: Sensitivity Analysis
The most striking feature of the results reported in Figures 9a—9b and Table II is that high rates of
education finance equalization remain optimal, no matter how large the intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply c. Even when preferences become linear in effort, e =+, theincome—maximizing
and efficient rates of equalization are still r =39.2%and r =59.6%.The corresponding shares
of educational resources being redistributed are b(r,.) =11.3%and b(r) =16.5%,and the
resulting gains still amount to 2.8% for output and 5.9% for efficiency.
The effect of the education return parameter is, once again, more complicated. A higher
lowers both r and Twhileat the same time significantly increasing the gains resulting from
these policies, compared to T= 0.For instance, as 3A rises from .05 (r is irrelevant when ftA =0)
to .30, i-i,. declines from 68.5% to 59.6% and r from 76.1% to 65.6%. At the same time, the
corresponding gains rise from 0.9% to 8.2% for output, and from 1.1% to 9.7% for efficiency. The
32With 1 —r= 2the figures are=74.9%, leadingto (X(i-),(1—r)A(r))= (.69,.17); and T= 93.1%,
leading to (r),(1
—r))(r)) = (.67,05).As to i-.,itis of course unchanged. Note that the data used
by Hoxby pertains only to elementary and secondary school budgets. This leaves out spending disparities at the
early childhood stage, which is often considered to play a critical role in shaping later educational outcomes.
29intuition is as follows. With labor supply distortions and insurance both playing relatively modest
roles, the key determinant of educational policy's impact on growth and efficiency is the relaxation
of credit constraints. This effect, measured by C(r)2(r) in (31), becomes more important as
!3) rises, i.e. as resource expenditure matters more for accumulation. Yet the optimal r declines,
because the accumulation technology gets closer to constant (private) returns; recall that (T)is
minimized at r =(1
—a—3A)/(1
—
Therole of family or peer effects is depicted on Figures lla—llb. The main impact of a is
now to reduce the optimal degree of equalization of school inputs across students from different
social backgrounds, as explained earlier. Thus, bothand r decline with a. The importance
of this result is best illustrated by starting from a case similar to that of Fernandez and Rogerson
(1998): a =0(no family or peer effect), 0(inelastic labor), and 3.X =.19.The optimal
policy is then complete equalization (r, = =1),and brings a 3.8% gain in long run output
over decentralized funding —a figure close to Fernandez and Rogerson's 3.2%. Incorporating the
benchmark labor response (c =.20)reduces r, to 92.1%, and the maximum gain to 3.2%. But
much more significant is the role of social background: with a =.35and 0,r, falls very
sharply,to 69.0%. On the other hand, long—run income gains are magnified by the higher total
return, a + j3\ : 4.6% under 11,, but only 3.9% under r =1.When social capital and labor
supply effects are combined the results are very close to those in Table II, third column, third
row:=63.8%raises output by 4.4%, while complete equalization yields only a 3.3% gain.
As explained earlier, risk—aversion plays much less of a role than under fiscal redistribution.
Figure 12a shows that the efficient progressivity ratestarts at 61.6% for 1 —r=0but rises
relatively slowly, to 68.2%, 74.9% and 88.3% for 1 —r =1,2 and 4 respectively. The corresponding
fractions of school expenditures being redistributed are b(r) =17.0%,18.7%, 20.3%, and 23.4%.
Except for very low values of risk—aversion, aggregate income still underestimates the value of
redistribution, although less so than with taxes and transfers; see Figures 7a—7b. The bias in
aggregate welfare, on the contrary, is now much more severe. Of course, pure equity considerations
(a positive value of 1/o) may well be more relevant in educational than in tax policy.
307 Conclusion
This paper has studied how progressive income taxation and educationfinance affect the level
and distribution of income in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy.The model was first
solved analytically, then quantitative policy exercises were performed. A simplecombination of
consumption taxes and education subsidies can help restore investmentto its undistorted level.
Whether or not this additional policy instrument is used, education finance always dominates taxes
and transfers from the point of view of growth, but is inferior from that of insurance. Simulating
the model with empirical parameter estimates leads to generally reasonableresults. For the
benchmark specification efficiency is maximized with transfers equal to 14% of GDP, orwith a
68% equalization rate for school expenditures. In both cases the richest 30% of familiesend up
subsidizing the education (and possibly the consumption) of the remaining 70%,whether through
school finance or through the fiscal system. More generally, the efficiency costs andbenefits of
redistribution remain of the same order of magnitude over a wide range of parameters values, so
that omitting either side can seriously bias the policy analysis. Another robust conclusionis that
per capita income and average welfare provide onlycrude lower and upper bounds around a more
proper (risk—adjusted but distribution—free) measureof overall efficiency.
The model's analytical structure has a number of advantages, which hopefully justifythe
strong simplifying assumptions which lie behind it. One isthe transparency of the insights ob-
tained from complete closed—form solutions. Another is allowing anyone to easily generatealter-
native policy assessments, by replacing in the formulas our parameter choices with their preferred
values.Finally, the model can be extended in several interesting directions. Onecould thus
analyze fiscal and educational policy jointly rather than separately, andlook for the optimal mix
which alleviates the imperfections in the credit and insurance markets with minimal distortions.
Another route is to endogenize the degree of redistribution through a political mechanism.This
is pursued in Bénabou (1996b), which seeks to explain how countries with similar economicand
political fundamentals can nonetheless choose very different fiscal and education systems.
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A Proofs for the Case of Income Taxation
Proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3






while for labor supply it is:
(1— p)[—(l —r)(/l)+i1'] =E [(U+1)r(3lflU+ /3lnh')(Dlnh'/Dl)]
5i=(l-r) [1+ (Et[(Ut+iY(DmnUt±i/nh')J)]
(A2)
We guess that the value function is of the form: in U = V in h +B. Substituting into the Bellman
equation yields:
Vtinht+Bt = max{(i_p+p3V1)(1_ru1n1_(i_p)S(1)77}
+ max {(1 —p)ln((1 —V)/(i+ °))+pj3V+1 ln(vt(1 +at))}
+ [(i —p)(i
—Yt)+ pVt+i(a + i3(1 —rt))]1nh+ (1— p + p!3Vt+i)rtint
—(p/r) [rVt+i(i —rVt+i)s2/2] +p(B+i ink). (A3)
This problem is strictly concave in V, as well as in 1 given ij ￿ i (strictly quasiconcavity in 1 is
even ensured for all ij >0).Therefore, if (A3) does hold, the first—order conditions are sufficient
to characterize the optimum. Moreover, in this case (Al)—(A2) immediately simplify to yield
Propositions (2) and (3). Now, (A3) requires that
V = (1 —p)(1
—r)A+ p(a + 3)(l —rt))Vt+1, (A4)
which yields (12). As to B, it is given as the solution to the difference equation:
32B —pB+i =(1—p+pj3V+1)(1 —rt)I2lnlt —(1 —p)ö(lt) +pV1lnic (A5)




with the transversality condition limt, (e_PtBt)= 0,which implies that B equals the present
value of the right—hand side terms. To simplify further, note that since all agents have the same
l =Itand i4 =utone can write:
ln h1 =ln+ in ,c + /3 in 5t + /3(1—it)ln It + (a + /3A( 1 —Tt))in h + 3r in t,(A7)
where ztv(1 + at). Thus h remains log-normally distributed over time. If ln h .iV(mt, ),
then(7) yields for Ytthevalue given by equation (27). Substituting into (A7) yields (25)—(26).
Let us now define WtVtmt + B, so that V(h) =V(lnh —in) +W. Substituting B =
Wt—Vmt into (A5), then using (25)—(26) to eliminate mt+i and ,thebudget constraint
(17) to eliminate Ut, and (27) to eliminate lnt, we obtain:
—pWt1=(i—p+ pi3V+1)(l —rt),ulnlt—(1— p)ö(lt) + pVt+ilnic
+(1 —p)ln(1 —Zt) +p/3Vt+1 lnst —(p/r)[rVt+i(1
—rVt+i)]s2/2
+(1 —p+ pJ3Vt+i)Tt [Amt + lnlt + (2 —t)2?/2]+ Vm
—pV+1[(a+ /3)\)mt + /3jlnlt + /3t(2
—rt)A2/2+ /3lnst + lnK —s2/2].
Therefore, denoting Wt W/(1 —p)
W — =/2lnIt—6 (i) +ln(1 —St)+Amt +rt(2 —r)X2/2+rp(1 —p)1V1s2/2,(A8)
where we used the recursion equation (A4) to simplify the coefficient on mt. Thus:
W W/(1 —) = (Amt+k + 11t+k + Tt+k(2 —rt+k)2+k/2)
+pk(ln(1—St+k) —6(lt+k)'1+rp(l —PY1Vtk+ls2/2). (A9)
It just remains to compute Pt (Xmt +jilnit + rt(2 —rtp2z?/2)as a function of the initial
distribution (mo, )andthe policy sequence {Yt,at, Now, (25) implies:
3300
pt0m+pAnlt +Tt (2— rt))2/2)
t=o
=(1—p(+A))1 (Amo +ppt(ln —52/2
+filn5t))
/ 00
+(1 + p(i— p( + ))_1)(pt{ini +Tt(2— \to
So, finally:
wt= 6111 I +pk
1—P° 1
1 —p(a + A) [(1— p(a+
in 1t+k —
t+kJ
[r(l -py'V2- () +Pk(1n(1 -5t+k) k=O
+ pA(lnk+ln5t+k))+ (—
00
—p(+) 1 —p(a+)) rt+k(2 —Tt+k)21.(AlO)
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Insteady—state it simplifies further, as L becomes equal to i-r) =s2/(l — p(r)2).
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us now examine consumers' preferred time paths of consumption taxes and associated
investment subsidies {Ot±k, at+k}0, given any expected redistribution path {rt+k}0. Note that
once the 9t+k are eliminated from the budget constraint (17), choosing {at+k}o is equivalent
to choosing {St+kVt+k(1 +at+k)}°0. Since an agent' i's utility is lnU =V(lnh
—mt)+ W
and V is independent of {Ot+k,at+k}D, all agree on the optimal path of {zt+k}°0, namely the
one that maximizes aggregate welfare W. By (Alo), this sequence is given by:
341 —p(a+ /3A) pI3A PI3A =—,or
5t+k 1 —,Oü
Proof of Proposition 8
Let x be a normal random variable with mean m, variance 2, and c.d.f. therefore equal to
F(x) = — m)/).By direct computation one easily establishes that, for any 0 and,\in R,
fedF(x)=em2/2)F(9
—A2)
Consider now the log—normal variable yeX.Itsc.d.f. is G(y) =F(lny),and the corresponding
LorenzcurveisF(r) =(f'
ydG(y))/(f ydG(y)) =()exdF(x)) /(i exdF(x))
Applying (A12) with A =1and 0 =F1(r)=m+ Y1(r) yields the claimed result.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, observe that (36) follows directly from (A8) and (24), given the definition ofin (35).
Turning now to the proposition itself, we can rewrite (A8) at t =0as:
Wo/(1 —)= —(1—r)2A2/2—6 (lt) + ln(1 —Zt)+ rp(1 —p)11s2/2)
Eo/(1_p)pt(lnyt_6(lt)+1n(1_t))
-rt)2A2 [rP(i - ) ('_ pp(r)) () -+ (PTk2) ]
Now,from (26) we know that
ft—i t—i
=fJP(TJc)2) L + { [Jp(rq)2) (A13)
k=O \k_—iq=k/
Therefore:
'-p pt[lnyt_6(lt))]+ln(1_s)+pt(1_rt)2(12 _Pr2) (2)
(A14)




—p)> —p(l+p(r)2 —2p(r))>0 ' 1 — pp(r)2(1— pp(r))2) —
''
(1— pp(r)2)(1 — pp(rt))2 —
35with strict inequality for all p(r) <1.This establishes the proposition, together with the fact that
the risk premium is always positive and minimized at r =1.
Finally, we prove the second result in the proposition. From (All) and (37), we have:




First,it is easily verified from (14) and (16) that ü(O) =0;this holds whether the investment
rate isor ii(r).Next,straightforward but somewhat tedious derivations show that 11A(°)+
(a/a-)3[(1
—r)2/(1 —pp(i-)2)J>0,with strict inequality unless p3) =1;and that 0) ￿ 0,
with strict inequality unless a + 3A =1.Therefore Ef(0) >0,hence 'r >0.
B Proofs for the Case of Education Finance
Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6










while for labor supply it becomes:
(1)[/1 171]=E[(Ut+i)r(51nUt+i/3inh/)(5lnh/afl]
oi =[i + pi3(l -Yt) (Et[(Ut+l(alnUt±i/lnh!)])]
(B2)
We guess once again that the value function is of the form: ln U =Vln h + B. Substituting
into the Bellman equation yields:
Vtlnht+Bt=max{(1_p+p3(1_r)v1)ln1_(1_p)6(1y7}
+max{(1 —p)ln((i —v)/(1+ 9))+pV1 ln(vt(l + at))}
36+ [(1 —p);+ pVt+i(a + i3(1 —rt))]lnh+ (pi3Vt+i)rtlnt
—(p/r) [r14+i(1—r%/÷i)s2/2]+p(B+1 +Vt+ilni). (B3)
Thus:
V =(1
—p)+ p(c+ /3A(1—rt))V+1, (B4)
which yields (20), as claimed. Proposition 6 then follows immediately from the first—order con-
ditions (B1)—(B2), which are again sufficient. The transition equation for lnh, the formula for
lnt and dynamics of the distribution (rnt,) remainunchanged from the case of income taxes.
Finally, B is given as the solution to the difference equation:
B —pB÷1 =(1—p+p13(1 —rt)Vt+i)iilnlt —(1 —p)6(lt) +pVt+i ink
+(i —p)ln((1 —vt)/(1+ Gt)) + pI3V+i ln(iit(1 + at))
+(pj3V+1) int —(p/r)[rV+1(1
—rV÷1)]s2/2 (B5)
with the transversality condition Iim (e_PtBt)= 0,which implies that B equals the present
value of the right—hand side terms. Defining again Wt V mt + B, so that 14(h) =V(In h —
m)+ Wt, then substituting the budget constraint (17) as well as 1n from (27), we obtain:
W —pW1 =(1—p+p/3(1 —rt)Vt+i),ln1t —(1 —p)(lt) +pV1lnc
+(1 —p)ln(1 —St) +pV+1 inst —(p/r)[rVt÷i(1
—r14+i)]s2/2
+(pi3Vt+i)r[Amt + in it + (2 —r)A2/2] +14 mt
—P14+i [(cr + jA)mt + /3jlni + (2— r)A2/2 + lnst +lnic —s2/2]
Wt —pWt+1=(1—p+ p(l —Yt) Vt+i)iilnit
—(1
—rt)p/3Vt+i(i.tinit)
+rt(2 —rt)2/2[p3Vt+1 — pi3V+i]+ mt[Vt —pVt+i(c+ 1 —
— p)ln(1 —St) — (1—p)6(l + (prV1)s2/2,
where we used (B4) to simplify the coefficient on mt. Thus, denoting again Wt W/(1 —p)
w— pW1=init
—6(i) + ln(1 —Zt) +.Xrrit + rp(l —p)'V1s2/2, (B6)
37and finally:
Wt =pk(Am+ lnlt+k) + (ln(1 —St+k)—6 (lt+k) + rp(1 —p)_lVk+1s2/2).
It just remains to compute Pk(Amt+k+ /Llfllt+k) as a function of the initial conditions
(mo,L) and the policy sequence {Tt,at,9t}0. Now, (25) implies:
Pt(Amt+ ln1t) =(1+ pA(1 —p(a+ y'ptlni) + p(a + ))_1
x(mo + ppt(ln —s2/2lnst + firt (2—
So, ultimately:
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+ + (1_ k [rtk(2 -Tt+k)
A22]
(B7)
Proof of the Education Finance Analogue of Proposition 4
Once again, choosing {Ot+k, at+k}O subject to the budget constraint (17) is equivalent to
choosing {St+k11t+k(1+at+k)}°0. Since an agent' i's utility is lnU =14(lnh —mt) +W and
14 is independent of {Ot+k,at+k}o all agree on the optimal path of {t+k}0, namely the one
that maximizes aggregate welfare W. By (B7), this yields 5t+k =zonce again.
C Aggregate Efficiency: the Case of Education Finance
By Proposition 5, the intertemporal utility of an agent i in period zero can be written as:
lnU =(1—p) (PtPYk) (lnh —mo)+ Pt(1nW —pinW+i).
The certainty—equivalent sequence {e},tothe random stream {c}0 is now defined as:
38ln —6(lt)(:P(Tk
(lnh
—mU)+ (W — — p). (Cl)
Given (A8) and (24), this implies once again that lnë and E0 [lnc j h] are related by (36). As
to the aggregate certainty—equivalent consumption, it is now equal to:
inin (fdi)
=indi + (C2)
Finaliy, economic efficiency is defined as before: E0 (1— p) pt[lnt— 6(lt)].The following
results underlie the claims of Proposition 11 in the text.
Proposition 12 The aggregate efficiency of a sequence of education finance equalization rates
{Tt}0equals: t—1 22
Eo=Wo+(l_P)(PtflP(rk)2)( 2)
Under a constant educational policy r, this becomes:
Eo(r) =(1-)pt[iny-6(l))}+ ln(l -z)-(- pp(r)2-
(1_çp(r))2)(2s2)
Proofof Proposition 12
We can rewrite the equation for W, at t =0as:
Wo/(1 —p)= (lnyt2/2— 8(lt) + ln(1 —St) +rp(1 —p)'V1s2/2)
Eo/(l—p)pt(lnyo(l)+l(l))
-p) ('_t)2(ç) - +
(P(rk)2)]
Substituting(A13) into the last term, we obtain the analogue to (A14) but with the (1 —Yt)2 's
replaced by 1. Under a constant policy, in particular, this yields the claimed result. Similar deriva-
tions can be carried out for any social welfare function associated to an interpersonal elasticity of
substitution a, hence the results which parallel those of Proposition 10.
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441. Fiscal Redistribution: Benchmark Case
Figure la. Aggregate Income, Efficiency and Welfare (1 —r = 1)
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7-7. Education Finance: Benchmark Case
Figure 'Ta. Aggregate Income, Efficiency and Welfare (1 —r = 1)
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Table I: Fiscal Redistribution
Values of in%,fordifferent
combinations of and A; benchmark case in bold.
maximizes aggregate income and consumption
maximizes utility from aggregate consumption and leisure
maximizes overall efficiency
maximizes aggregate welfare
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply




















































































































































































































































Table II: Education Finance Redistribution
Values of (4,i-i,r, 4,)in%,fordifferent
combinations of s and 3.\; benchmark case in bold.
4, :maximizes aggregate income and consumption
maximizes utility from aggregate consumption and leisure
maximizes overall efficiency
4,, maximizes aggregate welfare
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
elasticity of earnings to educational investment